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IIntroduction
In the latter part of the twentieth century the term mistress has not infrequently
been used to describe, in contradistinction to a kept woman, a woman who
cohabits in the same household with a male partner who is unmarried or who has
abandoned his de facto or de jure wife.] In Davis v. Johnson 2 Lord Kilbrandon
regretted the use of the term mistress in this context. In his view the term mistress
more accurately portrayed a "woman installed, in a clandestine way, by someone
of substance, normally married, for his intermittent sexual enjoyment."3 Lord
Kilbrandon doubted whether this latter category ofwomen continued in existence
in late twentieth century society.
Freeman and Lyon have also declined to employ the word mistress to describe a
female partner who lives permanently in an unmarried state with amale partner in
the same household. They have suggested that the concept of a mistress is wholly
sexist and that the term mistress carries connotations of an exclusively illicit and
outdated sexual relationship.4
These disparaging observations pertaining to mistresses may result from an
excessively rigorous conceptualization of extra-marital relationships into two
distinct categories, the first consisting of cohabitants and the second consisting of
kept women. Whether extra-marital relationships should be granted legal
protection remains somewhat controversial.5 There tends, however, to be a
general acceptance that if such relationships are to be brought within the bounds
• Of the School of Law, University of Buckingham.
I. See, e.g., Kingdom, (1988) 15Jo. of Law and Soc. 77; Masson, [1979] Conv. 184; Richards,(1976)40
Conv. NS 35; Richards v. Dove [l974J I All E.R. 888, at p.894.
2. [1979] A.C. 264.
3.Ibid., at p.338. See also the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Davis v.Johnson [1979] A.C. 264, at
p.270.
4. Freeman and Lyon, Cohabitation without Marriage (1983), at p.5.
5. See, e.g., Freeman and Lyon, (1980) 130 N.L.J. 228; Deech, at p.300, in Marriage andCohabirarion
in Contemporary Societies (1980); Freeman and Lyon, Cohabitation withour Marriage (1983), at p.183 er
seq.; Gammans v. Ekins [1950] 2 K.B. 328, at p.334; Richards v. Dove [1974] I All E.R. 888, at p.894;
Dyson Holdings v. Fox [1975] 3 All E.R. 1030, at p.1036; Helby v. Rafferty [1978] 3 All E.R. 1016, at
p.1022 er seq.; Warson v. Lucas [1980] 3 All E.R. 647. at p.653 er seq..
117
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
of law only the first category of relationship is worthy of protection. Parker has
explained that "the law is engaged in reproducing the traditional patriarchal
family form by assimilating threats to the marital norm within a slightly wider
definition of marriage."6
In this article the term mistress will be used to refer to the second category of
women. A mistress is a woman who is kept by, or receives some financial support
from, a visiting male lover. Her male lover normally resides with another woman
in a dejure or de facto matrimonial relationship.7 The plight of the mistress when
her relationship of dependency comes to an end has, for the most part, been
ignored. Until the enactment of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and
Dependants) Act 1975 law reformers, legislators and the judiciary tended to
disregard the highly vulnerable position of the mistress on the death of, or
breakdown of her relationship with, her lover. Their attention has, instead, been
centred on the dilemmas faced by cohabitants whose relationship has ended. The
mistress, no less than the cohabitant, may find herself homeless and without the
financial means of maintenance. Those who deplore the mistress relationship may
view it as a deviation from the societal norm ofmonogamous perfection in that the
mistress and her lover's wife co-exist in a state of quasi-polygamy which detracts
from the approved matrimonial model. If this latter ideal is to be buttressed, the
relationship ofmistress and lover must be distinguished from defacto matrimonial
relationships for the purpose of excluding it from any expanded definition of
marriage. Critics, therefore, have been inclined to stress the demode and tawdry
nature of the mistress relationship with its overtones of commercial sexuality, and
by so doing marginalize the relationship.s If a mistress is no more than one of a
dying species of glorified prostitutes it becomes feasible for the critics to seek to
prevent the extension to a mistress of those legal remedies offered to partners
cohabiting in a quasi-matrimonial relationship.
These derogatory images of the mistress are not reflected in studies relating to
mistresses. The mistress is neither amember of a rare breed9 nor is she primarily a
personal prostitute. Rigid categorisation of extra-marital relationships is not only
fallacious but may also prove to be dysfunctional in its perceived protection of the
institution of marriage. Empirical research in the mistress context has revealed
that the label mistress is "an opaque umbrella term for a multitude of types" of
kept women rather than one category. The term mistress does indeed encompass
6. Cohabirees (1981), at p.222 et seq. See also Freeman and Lyon, supra n. 5, at p.145 et seq.; Bruch,
(1976) 10 Fam. Law Q. 101; Eekelaar, (1975) 38 M.L.R. 245; Report of the New South Wales Law
Reform Commission on De Facto Relationships 1983; Family Law Act (Ontario), SO 1986, c. 4 ss. I,
29.
7. A mistress will not normally be cohabiting in a permanent relationship with a male parmer during
the currency of her relationship with her lover. See, however, Horrocks v. Forray [1976] I All E.R. 737,
at p.739; Robinson v. Cox (1741) 9 Mod. 262, 88 E.R. 439.
8. See nn. 2 and 4 supra. See also Salamon, The Kept Woman (1984), at p.l9 et seq..
9. See, generally, Salamon, supra n. 8; James and Kedgley, The Mistress (1973); Sands, The Making of
the American Mistress (1981). See also Coleridge, (October 1987) Harpers and Queen, at p.216; Mayle
(April 1987) Gentleman's Quarterly, at p.50.
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relationships which resemble an exclusive form of prostitutionlO but it also
includes stable long term visiting relationships which contain many of the
incidents of marriage. A mistress engaged in this latter form of relationship may
regard herself, in some sense, as the quasi-polygamous wife of her lover,
performing many of the roles normally associated with a traditional wife. II She
may, for example, give birth to and care for children.12 Unlike the cohabitant,
neither the mistress as prostitute nor the mistress as quasi-polygamous wife have
expectations that their lovers will abandon their current matrimonial relationships
for their sake. 13 It is difficult not to reach the conclusion that it is not only the
mistress but also the cohabitant who poses a threat to the monogamous ideal of
marriage. 14
Whether a dependent mistress falls into the category of quasi-polygamous wife
or personal prostitute, if her relationship with her lover ends, she will face similar
problems to those facing a dependent cohabitant. She has been encouraged to offer
her services to amale partner in return for financial dependency. 15 Ifthat financial
support is withdrawn at the end of the relationship she is likely to find herself
without a home and will have to seek an alternative means of earning a living. If the
relationship of dependency has continued for a substantial period of time she may
find herself disadvantaged as a direct result of that dependency when seeking to
re-enter the labour market.16 In these circumstances, a mistress, no less than a
cohabitant, requires legal solutions to the problems facing her at the end of a
relationship.
The focus of this article is fixed upon legal approaches to the problems faced by
mistresses at the end of a relationship, and, in particular, the extent to which the
Inheritance Act has ameliorated these problems.
II Limited Legal Redress for Mistresses
Statutory provision, although limited in scope, has extended some legal
protection to parties engaged in extra-marital sexual relationships. With the clear
10. See, e.g. , the Canadian casesofR. v.Garau (1891) I c.c.c. 66; Queenv. Elise Rehe (1898) I c.c.c.
63. See also Robinson v. Cox (1741) 9 Mod. 262,88 E.R. 439.
II. See, e.g., Malone v. Harrison [1979] I W.L.R. 1353, at p.1356.
12. See, e.g., Horrocksv. Foray [1976] I All E.R. 737; Tannerv. Tanner [1975]3 All E.R. 776;Coombes
v. Smith [1986] I W.L.R. 808.
13. See Malone v. Harrison [1979] I W.L.R. 1353, at p.1357.
14.The mistress relationship poses a threat in two ways.First, although the mistress has no expectation
that her lover will leave his wife and marry her, his wife is less likely to tolerate the long term
continuation of the mistress relationship once she becomes aware of it. Sexual exclusivity remains the
linchpin of traditional marriage. Divorce is likely to ensue: see, generally, Lawson, Adultery: An
Analysis of Love and Betrayal (1988). Secondly, the mistress relationship in most circumstances will
have disastrous economic consequences for a marriage: see, e.g., Horrocks v. Forray [1976] All E.R.
737, at p.739.
15. Oliver, [1978]G.L.P. 81, at p.85.
16. See Welstead, Propn'ecary Estoppel and the Family Home, at p.95 (unpublished PhD Thesis,
University of Cambridge, 1987).
119
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
exception of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975,17
Parliament has tended to adopt a status based model in legislation relating to
extra-marital relationships. Statutes have been worded with the purpose of
protecting only those parties who live together in relationships which correspond
with traditional marriage. IS The mistress may have difficulty in obtaining
statutory protection under status based legislation.
Non-statutory principles, both legal and equitable, have also been employed by
mistresses seeking legal redress, but with little success. Judicial interpretation of
principles of contract, constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel, although in
principle relationship neutral, has militated against the interests of the mistress.
(a) Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Acc1976
In 1976, legislation was enacted empowering the courts to grant protective
injunctions restraining one spouse from molesting another and, where necessary
to prevent further violence, excluding the molesting spouse from occupation of the
matrimonial home}9 Section 1(2) of the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial
Proceedings Act 1976 extended these protective injunctions to "a man and a
woman who are living with each other in the same household as husband and
wife."20 The narrow wording of section 1(2) of the Act has been construed in a
manner which will exclude most mistresses from the protection of the Domestic
Violence Act.
InDavis v.Johnson,21 Lord Denning MR accepted that the Domestic Violence
Act did not apply to mistresses. He distinguished such women from defacto wives
living in the same household as their cohabiting male partners. Lord Denning MR
regarded a mistress, somewhat deprecatingly, as a woman involved in a "casual,
impertinent and secret" relationship. 22This category ofwoman, he thought, could
not claim the protection of the Domestic Violence Act.
In the House of Lords, inDavis v.Johnson,23 Lord Kilbrandon also rejected the
possibility that mistresses might obtain protection under the Domestic Violence
Act. He maintained that section 1(2) of the Act was "for the protection of
families-households in which a man and a woman either do or do not bring up
children - the man and the woman being for whatever reason unmarried. "24
In spite of these judicial dicta courts may be prepared to accept that a mistress
should receive the protection of the Domestic Violence Act where she can
17. See, infra, at p.130.
18. In addition to the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 which is discussed in
this paper, see also Rent Act 1977, Schedule I, Part I, para 2; Housing Act 1985, section 87. See also
Hill, (1987] Conv. 349.
19. See Wright, (1980) 130 N.L.J.; Masson (1979] Conv. 184.
20. See Wright, (1981) II Fam. Law 221. See also Davis v.Johnson (1979] A.C. 264, at p.334. el seq..
21. Ibid., at p.264.
22. Ibid., at p.270.
23. Ibid., at p.264.
24. Ibid., at p.338.
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demonstrate that her relationship with her lover was ofIong duration and involved
at least some element of cohabitation. The relationship, for example, may have
involved cohabitation during the weekbut weekends apart in circumstances where
the lover worked away from home and returned to his family at weekends. The
couple may also have spent significant periods of time on holiday together. It may
be appropriate to describe the mistress here as a part-time cohabitant.25 The law
has already accepted that an application under the Domestic Violence Act may be
brought by a partner who is not actually living with the molesting party at the time
of the court hearing. The applicant may have been forced to leave home because of
the molestation. A court will only refuse to entertain an application in these
circumstances if the length of the separation suggests that the applicant no longer
requires the protection of the court. 26The judgments of Lord Denning MR in the
Court of Appeal and of Lord Kilbrandon in the House of Lords, in Davis v.
Johnson, stress the importance of the stability of the "living together relationship",
prior to the application, as a factor in determining whether an applicant comes
within the ambit of section I(2) of the Domestic Violence Act. Stability of the
applicant's relationship was also considered to be a relevant issue by the House of
Commons Standing Committee during the Committee stage of the Bill on
domestic violence. Miss Richardson MP explained that "the words, 'living with
each other in the same household' are intended to avoid a casual relationship, but
to indicate a continuing state of affairs."27 It would seem not unreasonable to
extend to mistresses the protection of the Domestic Violence Act. A mistress,
particularly one with a child, is in no less a predicament than a cohabitant who
faces domestic violence.28
(b) Contractual remedies
Amistress who wishes to make a claim against her lover based on an express or
implied contract is liable to confront at least two obstacles. First, she must
25. See, e.g., Malone v.Harrison [1979] 1W.L.R. 1353,at p.1357. Hollings J inMalone v.Harrison (at
p.1359) describes the mistress as a part-time mistress. Perhaps he meant a part-time cohabitant. In Re
Labbe and McCullough (1979), 23 OR (2nd) 536, the Ontario Provincial Court granted financial
support under section 14(b)(i), para. 2 the Family Law Reform Act 1978(Ont), c. 2 (now see section 29,
Family Law Act 1986(Ont) c. 4) to awoman who had lived witha man for only six weeksoutofa total
period of relationship of nineteen months, It is of interest to note that a new form of matrimonial
relationship exists in late twentieth century English society in which husband and wife live happily
married but apart: see Wyn-Ellis, (November, 1988)Harpers and Queen, at p.176,
26. See Adeosa v. Adeosa [1980] 1W.L.R. 1535,at p.1538; O'Neil v. Williams [1984] F.L.R. 1, at p.9;
McLean v.Nugent [1979] 1F.L.R. 26;McLean v.Burke [1981]3 F.L.R. 70; WhiTev. WhiTe [1983]2All
E.R. 51; Ainsbury v. MillingTOn [1986] 1 All E.R. 73.
27. Standing Committee F Col. 9, 20 June 1976.
28. Goff LJ in Davis v. Johnson [1979] A.C. 264, at pp.299, 300 explained the predicament of a
cohabitant faced with domestic violence in the following terms: "Either she stays and suffers further
battering as sooften happens, or she goes off and fends for herself, leaving the child or children with the
violent father, which may be even worse, or she takes them with her to what is often very inadequate
and squalid accommodation,"
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demonstrate that there was the requisite intention to enter into legal relations.29
Where the parties have expressed their agreement, with respect to their
relationship, in writing, there will be little difficulty in proving the requisite
intention. It will, however, be rare for the parties to make an express agreement at
least during the currency of the relationship. Second, the courts have shown a
general reluctance to enforce contracts in respect of relationships involving extra-
marital sexual conduct. Whether the contract is based upon sexual consideration
or its purpose is a sexual relationship, the law tends to the view that the contract is
contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable. 30An elaborate case law has,
however, grown up excepting certain contracts involving extra-marital sexual
conduct from defeasance.
Where a contract is made by deed or there is some alternative form of
consideration, contracts in respect of past cohabitation have normally been
regarded as enforceable. In Ayersr v. Jenkins,31 Lord Selbourne, the Lord
Chancellor, maintained that covenants founded on past extra-marital sexual
conduct "whether adulterous, incestuous, or simply immoral, are valid in law."32
In his view, similar contracts founded on future extra-marital sexual conduct are
invalid as they tend to encourage illicit behaviour.33
InRe Wooton Isaacson, Sanders v. Smiles ,34it was also held that a deed founded
on past extra-marital sexual conduct was valid. The mere fact that similar future
conduct was contemplated by the parties was insufficient to invalidate the deed. If,
however, the deed was actually founded on both past and future extra-marital
sexual conduct, it would be invalid.35
A number of eighteenth and nineteenth century mistress cases suggest that a
further refinement of the doctrine relating to immoral contracts can be made.
Where the mistress relationship commenced by an act of seduction by the male
partner or where there were quasi-matrimonial incidents to the relationship, such
as long term stability or children, the courts followed the approach in Ayerst v.
Jenkins and validated contracts based on past consideration. Public policy
demanded that legal redress be given to the mistress. In Nye v. Moseley,36 for
example, a young servant was provided with a cottage by her employer for the
29. SeeBalfourv. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571, at pp.578, 579. See also Layton v.Martin (1986) 16Fam.
Law 212.
30. SeePearce v.Brooks (1866) L.R. I Exch. 213, atpp.217, 218; Upfillv. Wnght [1910] I K.B. 506, at
p.510; Fender v. Sr John Mildmay [1938] A.C. I, at p.42.
31. (1873) 29 L.T. 126.
32. Ibid., at p.128.
33. SeeRobinson v. Gee (1749) 1Yes. Sen. 251,27 E.R. 1013;Fordv. De Pontes (1861) 30Beav. 572, 54
E.R. 1012. The major question confronting the courts has been whether the enforcement of the
contract would tend to encourage the illicit conduct. It was argued inNye v.Moseley (1826) 6 B. & c.
133, 108 E.R. 402, at p.403 that "holding such bonds to be void will have a tendency to prolong the
illicit intercourse, because it will then be the woman's interest to prevail upon the man to continue to
live with her.
34. (1904) 21 T.L.R. 89.
35. See Friend v. Ham'son (1827) 2 C. & P. 584.
36. (1826) 6 B. & C 133, 108 E.R. 402.
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purpose of a visiting extra-marital relationship with him. Two children were born
of the relationship. The employer subsequently terminated his relationship with
the servant and executed a bond to pay her an annuity for herself and the children.
Bayley J held that a bond given to a single woman by her lover "as premium
pudicitae at a time when he terminates the illicit connection, is valid. "37The Court
was prepared to uphold the contract here because it would make reparation for the
damage suffered by awoman who prior to this relationship "had conducted herself
with propriety and morality". 38Furthermore, the enforcement of the contract
would benefit the children of the relationship.
Where the mistress relationship has been viewed as one of prostitution, the
courts have declined to give effect to a covenant founded on past cohabitation. In
Robinson v. COX,39 the defendant mistress was given a promissory note by the
deceased prior to his death. He had maintained the mistress and provided her with
a house during his lifetime and visited her once a week. The defendant was not
only the mistress of the deceased, but also a common prostitute. The Court
distinguished between "a woman who has been modest to the rest of the world,
and lain with none but the man who has given her such note or bond"40 and a
woman who engaged in prostitution. The former was deemed worthy of the
Court's protection. The Court made the presumption that the latter should be
denied a remedy because "as women of the town are full of design and artifices to
impose upon people, that they therefore do make use of such artifices, and are
guilty of some fraud or imposition, in getting such notes; and this presumption is
made from general principles of policy ... to prevent women of the town taking
any advantage of their artifices."41
Dwyer42 has questioned whether the old authorities relating to immoral
contracts can be accepted as good law today without some qualification. He has
suggested that the courts' acknowledgment of the dramatic change in the sexual
mores of society which has led to the validation ofcontracts involving extra-marital
sexual conduct may require a revision of the doctrine relating to immoral
contracts. Dwyer's argument may be correct in the context of decisions
concerning cohabitation in a de facto marital relationship.43 There remains,
however, considerable uncertainty whether the courts will be prepared to extend
this liberated approach into the mistress context. Two modern cases illustrate the
courts' approach to contractual claims involving mistresses in twentieth century
37. Ibid., at p.403.
38. Ibid., at p.402.
39. (1741) 9 Mod. Rep. 263, 88 E.R. 439.
40. Ibid., at p.44 I.
41. Ibid.
42. (1977) 94 L.Q.R. 386, at p.387. See also Poulter, 124N.L.J. 999, at p.1034; Oldham and Caudill,
(1984) 18 Pam. L.Q. 93, at pp.97, 106 et seq.
43. See, e.g.,Marvinv. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal 3d 660, 815;Andrewsv. Parker [J973] Qd. R. 93; Stanley
v. Stanley (1960) 23 D.L.R. (2nd) 620;(1962) 36D.L.R. 443; Wardv.Byham [1956] 2 All E.R. 318. See
also HeglibistonEstablishment v. Heyman (1977) 121 Sol. Jo. 851.
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society. The decisions suggest that the courts have not entirely abandoned the
traditional approach outlined in the early case law.
In Tanner v. Tanner,44 the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of a mistress,
abandoned with young children, on the breakdown of her relationship with her
lover by inferring a contractuallicence.45 Here, the plaintiff, a married man, had
lived with his wife and adult children whilst at the same time indulging in a visiting
relationship with the defendant mistress. At the commencement of the
relationship, his mistress lived in a rent controlled flat as a protected tenant.46 She
subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to twins. The plaintiff began to lose
interest in the relationship. He did, however, purchase a house, installed his
mistress and their children on the ground floor and let the upper floor to tenants.
The mistress managed the lettings and collected the rent. In this way, the mistress
and children were partially maintained.47
The defendant mistress was only one of a number of women with whom the
plaintiff had a visiting relationship. Eventually, the plaintiff broke off his
relationship completely with the defendant and asked her to leave his property. He
had, by this time, divorced his wife and married another woman who was pregnant
with his child. He wanted the property to enable his new family to have a home
there. He therefore brought proceedings against the defendant for possession of
the property. The defendant counter-claimed 'inter alia' that she had a long term
licence to occupy tre property.48 The Court of Appeal granted the defendant's
counter-claim and iD.ferred that the terms of the contractual licence were such that
her occupation of the plaintiff's property was to be protected until the children
were no longer of school age.
In Tanner v. Tanner the Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to confront the
issue of immoral consideration. This is implicit in the decision in that the Court
accepted that the plaintiff had effectively ended his relationship with the
defendant by the time she relocated to his property.49 The Court viewed the
purpose of the contract in terms of a benefit to the defendant in her capacity as
mother of the plaintiff's children and not as his mistress. Lord Denning MR also
found that the defendant mistress had provided the requisite consideration for a
contractual licence, because she had relinquished her rent controlled tenancy
when she moved to the plaintiff's property.
44. [1975]3 All E.R. 776. See also Barron, (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 168. .
45. A contra,ctuallicence is a licence granted under the terms of some form of contract which restricts
the licensQt~sright to revoke it: see Errington v. Errington [1952J I K.B. 290; Binions v. Evans [1972]
Ch. 359;DHN Food Distributors Lrd. v. Tower Hamlets LBG (1976] I W.L.R. 852;Re Sharpe (1980] I
W.L.R. 2'19;Ashburn Ansralr v. Arnold (1988] All E.R. 147.
46. Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 3 All E.R. 776, at p.779.
47. The mistress and children were dependent primarily on social security for their maintenance.
48. Tanner v. Tanner [1979] All E.R. 776, at p.779. Counsel for the defendant had alternatively
submitted that a trust could be inferred whereby she obtained a beneficial interest in the property for
herself and her children. The County Court judge rejected this contention and there was no discussion
of this point in the Court of Appeal.
49. (1976] I All E.R. 737, at p.745.
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By the time the defendant's claim had reached the Court of Appeal, she had left
the plaintiffs property in pursuance of an order made by the County Court. In
those circumstances the Court of Appeal awarded her £2000 for the loss of her
contractual licence.
The decision in Tanner v. Tanner reflects the approach taken in the early
mistress cases. Lord Denning MR took the view that the defendant had not only
"a moral duty to provide for the babies of whom he was the father", but also "a
duty to provide for the mother."50 Public policy demanded that the plaintiff
should take responsibility for his children and their mother at the end of an illicit
relationship.
Six months after the decision in Tanner v. Tanner, a differently constituted
Court of Appeal refused to grant a contractual remedy to a mistress with children
after the sudden death of her lover. The defendant mistress inH orrocks v .Forray 51
had been the deceased's mistress since the age of fifteen. Their relationship of
some seventeen years had endured until the moment of death. Throughout this
time, the deceased had lived with his wife who remained totally unaware of the
existence of his mistress and child. The deceased had purchased a house for his
mistress in which she lived with their child and a child of her previous marriage.
Immediately after the unexpected death of the lover, his executors learned of
the existence of the mistress and her home. They brought proceedings for
possession of this property. The defendant relied on the decision in Tanner v.
Tanner and argued that she had a contractual licence for life or for as long as the
daughter was receiving full-time education or for as long as she and the daughter
reasonably required the property as their home.52 She maintained that she had
given consideration for this licence because she had left her previous home and had
also withheld any action for an affiliation order for her daughter.
The Court of Appeal rejected the mistress' contention. It accepted that the
deceased had intended to provide for his mistress and daughter but not in the form
of a contractual licence to occupy the property. 53 According to the Court of
Appeal, there was neither evidence of an intention by the parties to enter into legal
relations nor of the necessary consideration from which the Court might be
prepared to infer a contract. 54
In Horrocks v. Forray, Scarman LJ attempted to distinguish the decision in
Tanner v. Tanner and thereby limit its application in the future. He suggested that
an inference of a contract could readily be drawn in those circumstances where the
relationship of mistress and lover was close to breakdown and both parties wished
to arrange for the future of their children. 55 In Tannerv. Tanner, in his view, "the
50. Tanner v. Tanner [1975J 3 All E.R. 776, at p.779.
51. Horrocks v. Forray [1976] 1 All E.R. 737.
52. Ibid., at p.74O.
53. Ibid., at p.744.
54. Ibid., at p.745.
55. Ibid.
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woman was concerned for herself and her children: the man concerned to limit and
define his financial responsibilities towards the woman and the children,"56 In
Horrocks v.Forray, according to Scarman LJ, the parties had not contemplated the
sudden accident that had befallen the deceased. The circumstances here were
those of "a continuing, warm relationship of man and mistress"57 living in
luxurious and extravagant style right up to the moment of death. The subject of
contractual licences was far from the parties' minds.
Scarman LJ also found that the deceased's provision for his mistress was
generous beyond what one would reasonably expect the man to provide in a legally
binding obligation. It was generous, not because he was bound, or was binding
himself, to be generous, but because he chose to be generous to the woman "for
whom there was a big place in his heart."58 The implication ofthis view is that a
less generous provision would be provided had the parties chosen to regulate their
relationship by contract.
Scarman LJ did not, therefore, think it right for the Court to infer a contractual
licence on the facts inHorrocks v. Forray. According to Scarman LJ, there was,
however, nothing contrary to public policy which prevented a court of law from
enforcing an express contract which provided maintenance for a mistress who
cared for her lover's child. He suggested that it was better for parents in such a
situation" ... to regulate their position by contract than that they should have to
resort to the court under the Affiliation Proceedings Act."59It remains uncertain
whether the dicta of Scarman LJ support the view that the courts will enforce an
express contract, regulating a mistress relationship from the outset or whether
they merely reinforce the traditional view that the courts will only enforce a
contract in circumstances where the relationship is at an end,60
In Horrocks v,Forray, the deceased's estate was at risk of insolvency because of
his extravagant lifestyle. The wife of the deceased, who was unaware of the
defendant mistress' existence until after her husband's death, would have been left'
with financial problems unless the mistress' home could be sold.61 The Court of
Appeal implicitly weighed up the competing claims of the wife and mistress. The
latter had been treated generously in her lifetime. The Court of Appeal was not
prepared to jeopardize the financial future of a legitimate wife by inferring a
contract in favour of a mistress in the context of a continuing relationship.
(c) Constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel
Where a lover has provided a home for his mistress during the currency of the
relationship, she may wish to preserve this home when the relationship is
56. Ibid, See Dwyer, (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 386, at p.397 for a criticism of this view.
57. [1976] 1 All E.R. 737, at p.745.
58. Ibid., at p.746.
59. Ibid., at p.745.
60. See n. 35, supra.
61. [1976] 1 All E.R. 737, at p.739.
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terminated. In the absence of awritten express grant of a legal or an equitable title
in the property in her favour, a mistress may resort to the doctrine of constructive
trusts or the analogous doctrine of proprietary estoppe1.62 She is, however,
unlikely to achieve success in protecting her home under either doctrine.
Under English law a mistress who wishes to establish a plea based on the
doctrine of constructive trusts, must assert the existence of an overt or an inferred
common intention that she should receive a beneficial interest in her lover's
property. In addition there must also be proof that she acted to her detriment in
reliance on that common intention.63It will be a rare case where a mistress is able
to show that there was an overt common intention that she should receive a
beneficial interest in her home. There are no reported mistress cases where such a
claim has been made. Where, however, a mistress is able to prove the existence of
an overt common intention, she must also prove the requisite detrimental reliance.
In Grant v.Edwards,64one of the few cohabitlfnt cases in which an overt common
intention was proven, the Court of Appeal held that detrimental reliance in the
context of constructive trusts included any conduct referable to the acquisition of
the property. 65In the majority of mistress cases, it will be difficult to meet this
requirement. Mistresses, by definition, are kept women who are dependent on
their lovers. They are unlikely to contribute money towards the acquisition of their
lovers' properties. InEves v.Eves,66substantial work relating to the material fabric
of the property was also accepted as evidence of detrimental reliance in
circumstances where the existence of an overt common intention had been proven.
A mistress who is able to demonstrate that she has made a labour contribution to
the property may succeed in a claim based on the doctrine of constructive trusts.
Where there is no overt common intention, the courts will be prepared to infer
the relevant intention from direct, substantial, financial contributions referable to
the property.67 For the reasons stated above, a mistress is unlikely to have made
such contributions.
A claim based on proprietary estoppel is not dissimilar to one based on the
doctrine of constructive trustS.68 In the aftermath of Taylors Fashions Ltd. v.
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd.69 it has been generally assumed that the
elements of proprietary estoppel can be condensed into two interlinked
62. See, e.g.,Re Sharpe [1980] I W.L.R. 219, at p.225; Walkerv. Walker (unreported, Court ofAppeal,
12April 1984);Grant v. Edwards [1986] 3 W.L.R. 114, at p.129. See also Welstead, supra n. 16.
63. See Gissing v. Gissing [1971] A.C. 886; Burns v. Burns [1984] Ch. 317; Grant v. Edwards [1986] 3
W.L.R. 114,at p.l20 et seq.. LloydsBankP.L.G. v.Rosserr [1990]I AllE.R.IIII (H.L.). SeealsoEekelaar,
[1987] Conv. 93; Warburton, [1986]Conv. 291; Hayton, [1988]Conv. 259.
64. [1986] 3 W.L.R. 114.
65. Ibid., at pp.122, 127. Cf. the approach of Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Grant v. Edwards to the
question of detriment. He suggested that "any act ... relating to the joint lives of the parties" is
sufficient detriment for a successful claim based on the doctrine of constructive trusts (at p.130).
66. [1975] I W.L.R. 1338, at p.l345.
67. See Grant v. Edwards [1986] 3 W.L.R. 114, at p.121.
68. See, supra, n. 62.
69. Taylors Fashions Ltd. v. Liverpool Victoria Trnstees Co. Ltd. [1982] Q.B. 133.
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requirements distilled from Oliver J's broad test of unconscionability in that case.
First, there must be an encouragement engendered by the proprietor that some
rights have been granted in or over the property. Secondly, the person in whom the
encouragement has been engendered must act to her detriment in reliance on that
encouragement.70 The detrimental reliance in the estoppel context need not relate
to the property nor even to the joint lives of the proprietor and claimant.71 In
satisfying any claim made under the estoppel doctrine, the court has complete
discretion over the remedy granted. 72The doctrine is thus more flexible than that
of constructive trusts; this flexibility has been of little benefit to mistresses who
seek to protect their homes.
In Coombes v. Smith,73 Judge Jonathan Parker QC accepted counsel's
observation that "if the plaintiff in the instant case has an equity to remain in
occupation of the property, then a similar equity may be expected to arise in the
majority of cases where there is a dispute over property between a man and his
mistress. "74 He thus made explicit the policy reasons for rejecting a mistress' claim
to occupy property based on a plea of proprietary estoppel.
The Court inCoombes v. Smith considered first the question of encouragement.
The defendant had provided a house for the plaintiff mistress and the child of their
relationship. He, meanwhile, continued to livewith his wife and family. When the
plaintiff asked him to place the property in joint names, he assured her that she
need not worry because "he would provide a roof over her head". 75It would not
seem unreasonable that the plaintiff should have inferred from this that she had
been encouraged to expect a permanent right of occupation. This, however, the
judge did not accept. He explained somewhat obscurely that "a belief that the
defendant would always provide her with a roof over her head is, to my mind,
something quite different from a belief that she had a legal right to remain there
against his wishes."76 The parties in Coombes v. Smith had not discussed what
should happen in the event of a breakdown in their relationship. The defendant's
statement that he would provide a roof over his mistress' head was, therefore, not
viewed as an encouragement by the Court. It was deemed to lack the necessary
clarity for the purposes of an estoppel claim.
Even if the Court in Coombes v. Smith had been prepared to make a positive
finding of encouragement it was not prepared to accept the mistress' claim of
detrimental reliance. The first act claimed by her as detrimental reliance was that
70. See, e.g. ,Amalgamated bwestment and Property Co. Ltd. v. Texas Commerce International Rank Ltd.
[1982J Q.B. 84; Cameron v. Murdoch [1983J W.A.R. 321. See also Welstead, supra n. 16.
71. Grant v. Edwards [1986J 3 W.L.R. 114, at p.130. See also Riches v. Hogben [1986] I Qd. R. 315.
72. See, e.g. ,Plimmer v. Mayor etc. a/Wellington (1884) 8 App. Cas. 699, at p.713; Crabbv.ArunD.C.
[1976] Ch. 179, at p.189; Grlffiths v. Williams (1977) 248 Estates Gazelle 947, at p.949.
73. [1986J I W.L.R. 808. See also Hayton, [1986] C.L.J. 395.
74. Coombes v. Smirh [1986] 1 W.L.R. 808, at p.821.
75. Ibid. Cf. the approach of the court in cases involving cohabitation, e.g. Pascoe v. Turner [1979] 1
W.L.R. 431; Greasley v. Cooke [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1306.
76. Coombes v. Smith [1986J 1 W.L.R. 808, at p.820.
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she had allowed herself to become pregnant by her lover . Judge Jonathan Parker
QC simply stated without explanation that he was "unable to treat the act of the
plaintiff in allowing herself to become pregnant as constituting detriment in the
context of proprietary estoppel."77 However, pregnancy outside the context of a
long term relationship and without the security of a home is normally regarded by
society as a detrimental alteration of position. There seems to be no clear reason
why pregnancy should not be treated as a relevant detrimental reliance for the
purpose of an estoppel claim.
The second act claimed as detrimental reliance by the plaintiff was that she had
left her husband, with whom she was unhappy, in order to move into the
defendant's property. The judge accepted the submissions of counsel for the
defendant that "whenever a woman moves into a house provided by a man, she
must have come from somewhere else; and that, if the mere fact of that inevitable
change were sufficient as detriment, there would be detriment in every case."78On
this basis, an estoppel claim would simply failon the ground that too many women
would otherwise be able to make estoppel claims if leaving one home and moving
into another were automatically accepted as relevant detrimental reliance. Such a
view disregards the possibility that women might still leave their husbands and
seek alternative accommodation rather than become the mistresses of men and live
in property provided by their lovers if they knew that their lovers would
subsequently attempt to evict them.
In Coombesv. Smith, the third and fourth acts claimed asdetrimental reliance by
the plaintiff took the form of giving birth to, and taking care of, the child of the
relationship. These acts, without further discussion, were also disallowed as
relevant detrimental reliance. There has traditionally been a reluctance in claims
for damages in contract or tort to accept that the birth of a child after the failure of a
sterilization operation can give rise to a compensatable claim.79Nevertheless,
there has been an acceptance in such claims that pregnancy inevitably leads to a
loss of income by the mother which can result in an award of damages.8o There
seems to be no reason, other than one based on policy considerations, why this loss
of income should not constitute detrimental reliance sufficient to found an
estoppel claim.
The plaintiff in Coombes v. Smith had also spent money and labour on the
decoration of the property. The Court rejected this act as detrimental reliance
without explanation, the assumption seeming to be that as she had already enjoyed
the benefits of such improvements, she had suffered no detriment.
77. Ibid., at p.820.
78. Ibid., at p.816.
79. See, e.g.,Jones v. Berkshire Area Health A uthority (Unreponed, Court of Appeal, 2 July 1986); Gold
v. Haringay Health Authority [I 987] 2 AIl E.R. 888, at p.890 per Lloyd LJ. See also, Symmons, (1987) 50
M.L.R.269.
80. See Emeh v.Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority [1984] 3 All E.R. 1044,
at pp.1051 et seq.
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Finally, the plaintiff claimed that she had deliberately refrained from looking
for a job. The judicial response to this claim was that the defendant had been
content to pay the bills and that the plaintiff had not therefore needed a job. The
Court failed to take account of the fact that the plaintiff would quite clearly suffer
detriment if the belief which she claimed had been engendered by the defendant's
encouragement was not fulfilled. It was predictable that she would find difficulty
in finding a job, having absented herself from the employment market for
seventeen years.
The defendant had benefited from his mistress' conduct in caring for their child
and his property but implicit in the decision of the Court was the idea that the
defendant had benefited less than his mistress. The defendant was paying a small
amount of maintenance to the plaintiff for their child. He was also prepared to
permit the plaintiff a limited right of occupation in the property until their child
reached the age of seventeen.81 In these circumstances, the Court took the
approach that the mistress did not require the protection of equity.
III The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975-
Truly a Charter for Mistresses
Parliament clearly anticipated the possibility of a claim against a deceased's
estate by a mistress under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants)
Act 1975 (referred to in this article as the Inheritance Act).82The Earl of Mansfield
observed, during the committee stage of the Bill, that the class of those who would
be able to seek relief under the new legislation had been widened to include
mistresses who, in the future, would be" ... given amuch fairer crack of the whip
than ever before. "83
In Malone v. Harrison,84 Lord Mansfield's observations became fact. An
application for provision under the Inheritance Act wasmade for the first time by
a mistress. 85 The plaintiff had been the mistress of the deceased since she first met
him when she was aged twenty three. She had lived in properties, both in England
and abroad, purchased by her lover who financially supported her in a most
generous manner. He was described as a "consummate deceiver". He had not only
81. See also Savva v. Costa and Harymode Developments Lcd. [1981J 131 N.L.J. 1114.
82. During the debates on the Bill concern was expressed by those opposed to provision for mistresses
that the proposed legislation would permit claims by the mistress: see, e.g., H.C. Deb. Vol. 895, Col.
1690et seq., H.C. Deb. Vol. 898, Cols. 171, 172, 175, 187. The Law Commission considered the report
of the Law Reform Committee of Western Australia entitled "The Protection to be given to the Family
and Dependants" of a deceased person. In this report the Committee recommended the protection of
members of the deceased's household. Had the Law Commission adopted this approach the mistress
would have been left unprotected. See Law Commission No. 61, Second Report on Family Property:
Family Provision on Death (1976), para. 86.
83. H.L. Deb. Vol. 358, Col. 924. See also H.L. Deb. Vol. 358, Col. 932, per Lord Wilberforce.
84. [1979J IW.L.R. 1353.
85. Cf. Cadwallader, [l980JConv. pp.46,49; Green, [I988J 51M.L.R.187,at p:196. Both Cadwallader
and Green use the term mistress to describe a cohabitant.
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a wife but also a de facto wife and several mistresses who were largely unaware of
each other's existence. Hollings J acknowledged the likelihood that the deceased
did not want to distress his defacto wife by making express provision in his will for
an undisclosed mistress and granted the mistress financial provision from her late
lover's estate.86 The deceased in Malone v. Harrison had actually foreseen the
possibility of an application by his mistress under the Inheritance Act. He had sent
her a press cutting from the Sunday Times which explained in detail the
Inheritance Act which at the time was going through Parliament.
(a) Applications under section l(l)(e) of the Inheritance Act
Section 1(1)(e) of the Inheritance Act permits a mistress, inter alia, to apply for
provision from her deceased lover's estate if she has been maintained wholly or
partly by him immediately prior to his death and if the disposition of his estate did
not make reasonable provision for her.
(i) A person maintained by the deceased
Section 1(3)ofthe Inheritance Act provides that where an application is made
under section l(l)(e) of the Inheritance Act, a person will be treated as being
maintained by the deceased if he " ... otherwise than for full valuable
consideration, was making a substantial contribution in money or money's worth
towards the reasonable needs of that person."
InMa/one v.Harrison, Hollings Jmade merely fleeting reference to section 1(3)
because the executors had conceded that the mistress applicant came within
section 1(1)(e).87The mistress in Malone v. Harrison had undoubtedly been
maintained by the deceased for some twelve years prior to his death. The
maintenance had been lavish. The mistress had received furs and jewellery worth
£5,500; expensive holidays abroad; all her living expenses; the lease of a
hairdressing salon; a joint share in two flats and shares worth £15,000.
Section 1(3) of the Inheritance Act has normally been construed as a qualifying
provision to section 1(l)(e).88 In the absence of a concession by the deceased's
executors, a mistress will be unable to satisfy section 1(3) if she has given full
valuable consideration in return for her maintenance by the deceased. In Re
Beaumont,89 Megarry V-C maintained that an accounting exercise should be
undertaken for the purpose of section 1(3). He suggested that whether the
respective contributions made by the applicant and the deceased towards the
reasonable needs of the other were made under a contract or not they should be
balanced. If the deceased's contributions substantially outweighed those of the
applicant, the latter should be permitted to make a claim against the deceased's
86. Malone v. Harrison [1979] I W.L.R. 1353, at p.1359.
87. Ibid., at p.1360.
88. In re Beaumonr [1980] Ch. 444, at p.45\. See also Naresh (I 980) L. Q.R. 534, at p.535; Cadwallader,
(1981) 125 Sol. Jo. 175; Dewar, (1982) 12 Fam. Law 158.
89. [1980] Ch. 444, at p.45\.
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estate. If the applicant's contributions outweighed those of the deceased, the claim
must fail. 90
InJelley v.I1lffe,91 Stephenson LJ accepted that it was the Court's duty as a part
of the accounting exercise to assess the financial value of such imponderables as
companionship in addition to financial contributions. For this purpose he
suggested that the Court should ask the question "was this man dependent on this
woman during his lifetime ... or did he give as good as he got?"92
In the context of applications by a mistress, it is uncertain what approach the
courts will take in the accounting exercise necessitated by section 1(3). The very
nature of the mistress relationship involves the provision of services by the woman
for her lover rather than any financial contribution. These services will be
particularly difficult to evaluate.
Where a mistress has received substantial benefits during the lifetime of the
deceased, as inMalone v .Harrison, those benefits will without question outweigh
any contribution however evaluated. Where a deceased has been less generous in
his maintenance of his mistress, her claim may fail if her services to the deceased
are deemed to represent full valuable consideration for her meagre maintenance.
The anomaly exists that a mistress who has lavished loving care on a man who has
rewarded her meanly will be less likely to succeed than an uncaring mistress who is
well rewarded by the deceased. Megarry ]'S construction of section 1(3) of the
Inheritance Act appears to reflect the biblical message that" ... unto everyone
that hath shall be given, and [she] shall have abundance: but from [her] that hath
not shall be taken away . . ."
Section 1(3) of the Act refers to contributions by the deceased towards the
applicant's maintenance "in money or money's worth". It has been suggested that
contributions by an applicant in the form of companionship should only be taken
into account insofar as they involve services which would normally be paid for.94
InJelley v. I1ifle,95 Griffiths LJ suggested that in the circumstances of a man living
with a woman as his wife, providing the house and all the money for their living
expenses "she would clearly be dependent upon him, and it would not be right to
deprive her of her claim by arguing that she was in fact performing the services
that a housekeeper would perform and it would cost more to employ a housekeeper
than was spent on her."96 If courts are prepared to recognize that a mistress'
relationship with the deceased was of a quasi-polygamous nature, her
90. Ibid., at p.453.
91. [1981] 2 All E.R. 29.
92. Ibid., at p.36. Cf Re C (1979) 123Sol. Jo. 35;Re Wilkinson [1978] Fam. 22.
93. Matthew 25:29 (King James Bible). The courts may, of course, redress the inequity inherent in this
message in the exercise of their discretion under section 3 of the Inheritance Act.
94. See Bromley's Family Law 7th ed (1987), at p.740. See also Law Commission No. 61 Second
Repon, "Family Property: Family Provision on Death" (1974), para. 98H.C. Standing Committee C.
1974-75 Session, Col. 12.
95.Jelley v.llllffe [1981] 2 All E.R. 29.
96. Ibid., at p.38. See also Bishop v. Plumley (The Times, July II, 1990).
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contributions to the deceased's welfare may be viewed as not dissimilar to those of
a de facto wife.
Where, however, the relationship of the mistress and the deceased was primarily
of a sexual nature, the courts might be faced with a dilemma. To refuse to evaluate
the sexual contribution of the mistress would lead to a finding that her
maintenance by the deceased was otherwise than for full valuable consideration.
Such a finding would permit the mistress' application to be considered. If the
courts evaluate the sexual contribution and find that the mistress had thereby
given full valuable consideration, the mistress' application would fail, but the
court's evaluation of sexual contribution would be tantamount to giving
recognition to a contract for sexual services.97
(ii) Reasonable financial provision
Not only must a mistress show that she was being maintained by the deceased
prior to his death, she must also prove that the disposition of the deceased's estate
did not make reasonable financial provision for her. Section 1(2)(b) of the
Inheritance Act defines reasonable financial provision for a mistress applicant
claiming dependency on the deceased under section 1(1)(e) as "such financial
provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the
applicant to receive for [her] maintenance." A mistress who has received generous
provision from the deceased during his lifetime is not excluded from making an
application. In Malone v.Harrison although the mistress applicant had been well
recompensed during the deceased's lifetime she had received no benefit
whatsoever from the disposition ofthe deceased's estate. Thus clearly she fulfilled
the requirements of section I(2)(b ).
Where a mistress has received some provision from the disposition of the
deceased's estate, the question arises whether that financial provision is such as
". .. would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case" for her
maintenance. The court is enjoined to answer this question by having regard to the
matters outlined in section 3. This section will be considered below.98
(iii) Immediately before the death of the deceased
A mistress whose relationship ended prior to the death of her lover will receive
no assistance from the Inheritance Act. Section 1(I)(e) limits applications to those
for whom the deceased was actually financially responsible during his lifetime. A
financial duty cannot be imposed on the deceased's estate for a mistress for whom
the deceased had ceased to be financially responsible. 99
In Re Beaumont, Megarry V-C considered the meaning of the phrase
"immediately before the death of the deceased". He interpreted the phrase to
mean not necessarily "thede facto state or balance of maintenance at that moment
97. See, supra, n. 30.
98. See In re Callaghan [1984] 3 W.L.R. 1076; Virdi, (1982) 12 Fam. Law 240.
99. See, e.g., Kourkgy v. Lusher (1981) F.L.R. 65.
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[of death], but something more substantial and enduriIlg" such as the "settled
basis or arrangement between the parties as regards maintenance."! His concern
which led to this statutory reconstruction was twofold. First, he believed that an
application under section 1(l)(e) should not fail because in the immediate period
before death the applicant had cared for the deceased and thereby her contribution
had temporarily exceeded that of the deceased. Secondly, Megarry V-C wished to
prevent a person who was fortuitously being maintained at the moment of the
deceased's death from making a successful claim when there had been no
assumption of maintenance by the deceased at an earlier stage.2 To these concerns
expressed by Megarry V-C might be added a third. A deceased might, because of
illness or incapacity, be incapable of maintaining his mistress immediately before
his death. To deny her a right to apply under the Inheritance Act because of a
break in maintenance at this stage would be to thwart the purpose of the Act.3
(b)Matters to which the court is to have regard in its determination of
reasonable financial provision
The court is granted considerable discretion under section 3 of the Inheritance
Act. This section provides that the court shall have regard to a number of
interrelated matters to enable it to determine whether and how to satisfy a
mistresses' claim for maintenance from the deceased's estate. The task of the court
would appear to be remarkably similar to that of the Family Division in
proceedings relating to family provision after divorce.4
InMalone v.Harrison, Hollings J awarded the mistress applicant a capital sum
of £19,000. He explained that such an amount would provide for such
maintenance "as is reasonable in all the circumstances for the plaintiff to receive."5
The decision inMalone v.Harrison outlines the task of the court under section 3of
the Inheritance Act in its determination of an award of maintenance.
(i) The financial resources and financial needs of the applicant
Section 3(1)(a) of the Inheritance Act provides that the court must consider
what financial resources are available to the applicant in relation to her needs. In
Malone v. Harrison, the applicant's resources were not insubstantial. She had
capital assets of some £34,000 which were readily realisable. These assets did not
I. In re Beaumont [1980] Ch. 444, at p.452. Because Megarry V-C did not address the question of
whether a settled basis of maintenance was a necessary as well as a sufficient condition to satisfy the
requirement of section 1(1)(e) it is arguable that the decision inRe Beaumonl merely states that a settled
basis of maintenance is a sufficient condition. Where there is no settled basis of maintenance the courts
may have to look at the defaero state of maintenance. See Naresh, (1980) 96 L.Q.R. 535, at p.547. See
also Law Commission No 61 Second Repott on Family Property: Family Provision on Death (1974),
para. 93.
2. See Jelley v.Iliffe [1981] 2 All E.R. 29, at p.34 el seq.
3. Ibid.
4. See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.25 as amended by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings
Act 1984.
5. Malone v. Hamson [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1353, at p.1365. See also Bennet, (1980) 130 N.L.J. 565.
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include furs and jewellery. The Court, with the concession of the executors, was
not prepared to consider these latter gifts as part of the financial resources
available to the applicant.6
Hollings J accepted that the applicant's earning capacity was not good but
nonetheless took the approach that some form of employment was within her
capabilities. Such employment could be expected to make a fifty per cent
contribution to her needs. The approach of the Court was more than generous in
the context of a fit thirty eight year old female albeit one who was work-
inexperienced. Her earning capacity, according to the Court, had been
significantly weakened by her lover's negative attitudes to,wards her attempts to
obtain work during his lifetime. The deceased had preferred her to be available for
his needs.7 The applicant's lack of earning ability was a direct consequence of her
relationship with the deceased.
(ii) Resources and needs of other applicants .and benefician'es : obligations and
responsibilities of the deceased
The mistress was the only applicant for financial provision from the deceased's,
estate inMalone v.Harrison. Therefore, section 3(I)(b) of the Inheritance Act was
irrelevant. However, other mistresses might find themselves in competition with
another applicant such as de facto or de jure wives whose resources and needs
would have to be considered under this section.
InMalone v.Harrison, Hollings J attached considerable importance to section
3(1)(c) of the Inheritance Act which relates to the financial needs and resources of
the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries here were primarilydefacto ordejure members
of ~he deceased's family.s They included both a wife and a de facto wife. In
balancing out the resources and needs of the beneficiaries, Hollings J appeared to
rank the beneficiaries in accordance with what he viewed as the deceased's
responsibilities and obligations towards them in accordance with section 3(1)(d).
Hollings J implicitly took the approach that there was a lesser obligation on the
deceased to provide for his brother who already had a substantial income than to
make provision for other members of his family. He thus concluded that any order
for the mistress applicant should be deducted from the deceased's bequest to his
brother.
Where an applicant or beneficiary has a physical or mental disability, the court
must take this into account in determining any award.9
(iii) The size and nature of the deceased's estate
Section 3(1)(e) of the Inheritance Act provides that the court must take into
account the size and nature of the deceased's estate. Where an estate is of
6. Malone v. Harrison, supra n. 5, at p. 1358.
7. Ibid., at p.1356 er seq.
8. Ibid., at p.1362.
9. See section 3(1)(f), Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.
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substantial size, there will be little problem in making an order for the mistress'
reasonable maintenance. Any order made in these circumstances will however
relate to the level of maintenance received by the mistress during the deceased's
lifetime rather than to the sizeof the estate. Where an estate is small, the court may
be forced to scale down any award it would otherwise make.
InMalone v.Harrison, Hollings J acknowledged that the size of the deceased's
estate was significant only to the extent that there were sufficient resources to
make the award which he thought to be appropriate.lo
(iv) Any other matter
The court isgranted a general discretion under section 3(1)(g) of the Inheritance
Act to take into account "any other matter including the conduct of the applicant"
or any other person in deciding any application. InMalone v.Harrison, Hollings J
maintained that the deceased's conduct was an important factor in his decision. He
found that the deceased had monopolized the applicant for twelve years of her life.
The deceased had" ... discouraged her from seeking gainful employment. He
taught her to rely upon him for all her financial needs ... "11This did not mean
according to Hollings J. " ... that the deceased through his estate should be
punished, but as he was generous to her in her lifetime, so within the limits set by
the statute should the court be in deciding what if any order to make."12
(v) The deceased's assumption of responsibility
In accordance with section 3(4) of the Inheritance Act, the court, in its
determination of any entitlement for a mistress applicant, must have regard to the
"extent to which and the basis upon which the deceased assumed responsibility for
the maintenance of the applicant and to the length of time for which the deceased
discharged that responsibility."
InMalone v.Harrison, Hollings J stressed that section 3(4)ought to playa major
part in his decision. He did not however address the question of what constitutes
an assumption of responsibility for maintenance. Hollings Jmerely had regard to
the characteristics of the assumption of responsibility by the deceased for the
applicant's maintenance. In his view, the deceased had assumed full responsibility
for the applicant's maintenance during his lifetime for some twelve years ... on
the basis that he would not leave her unprovided for in case of his death. 13
Furthermore, the deceased had demonstrated unequivocally his desire that the
applicant should be dependent on him. He did not want her to work. He wished
10. Malone v. Harrison [1979] I W.L.R. 1353,at p.J364.
II. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. See Borthwick v. Borthwick [1949] I Ch., at p.401 where Harman J, in the context of an
application by a wife, thought that the conduct of the applicant towards the testator could not make the
difference between "whether you leave her starving in the gutter or not." Conduct could only be taken
into account in that "an extravagant or erring wife may be given less than one against whom nothing
can be said."
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her to be available for him so that he could " ... drop in at her flat in the late
afternoon after work to relax and talk to her about his work and other matters, and
he liked also to telephone her during the daytime, sometimes three or four times a
day.14
The question of what constitutes an assumption of responsibility for
maintenance arose in Re Beaumont. Megarry V-C took the approach that an
applicant had to prove that the deceased had actually assumed responsibility for
her maintenance. The mere fact of maintenance was insufficient. According to
Megarry V-C, without proof of an assumption of responsibility for maintenance,
the court could not have regard to the nature of the assumption of responsibility as
enjoined to do under section 3(4) of the Inheritance Act. In his view, any
application without proof of assumption of responsibility for maintenance would
have to be struck out by the court.15
This restricted view of section 3(4) of the Act would have left many mistress
applicants under the Inheritance Act without a remedy if they were unable to
point to any act, other than the fact of maintenance itself, which would provide the
necessary proof of an assumption of responsibility for their maintenance by their
lover. However, inJelley v./liffe,16 the Court of Appeal rejected the approach of
Megarry V-C in Re Beaumont. Stephenson LJ asked " ... how better or more
clearly can one take or discharge responsibility for maintenance than by actually
maintaining ... If B is A's mistress and he maintains her by providing her with
accommodation or money or both, has he not assumed or taken on responsibility
for her maintenance?"! 7 Stephenson LJ accepted that an assumption of
responsibility based on the fact of maintenance alone would be presumed but it
would be rebuttable by a disclaimer on the part of the deceased. Stephenson LJ
was influenced in his view by the object of the Inheritance Act which was to
remedy "the injustice of one, who has been put by a deceased person in a position
of dependency .... " Such a person was not to be "disentitled from applying for
provision ifhe can prove that the deceased by his conduct made him dependent on
the deceased for maintenance, whether intentionally or not."18
IV Conclusion
The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 was
courageous and creative legislation. Parliament explicitly recognised the injustice
resulting to a mistress when a testator, who has encouraged her dependency for
maintenance on him, makes no provision for the continuance of that maintenance
after his death. Amistress whose relationship ends with her lover's death need not
resort to stretching the vagaries of contract lawand equitable principles in the faint
14. Malone v. Harrison [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1353, at p.1356.
15. In re Beaumont [1970] Ch. 444, at p.445.
16. Jelley v. iliffe [1981] 2 All E.R. 29.
17. Ibid., at p.35 et seq.
18. Ibid., at p.36.
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hope that she will obtain redress. Nor does she have to resort to straining statutory
definitions to bring herself within the ambit of statutes designed to protect
cohabiting relationships. The discretionary nature of the Inheritance Act enables
the court to determine a mistress' claim in a manner which will do the least
injustice to beneficiaries, intestate successors and any other applicants under the
Act.
The Inheritance Act has not, however, been warmly welcomed by everyone. 19
Critics of the mistress relationship have made a number of accusations against the
Act. The Act is said to threaten not only freedom of testation and the institution of
marriage but also to prolong the harm done to a woman by the fact of induced
dependency during the lifetime of the testator. 20 To these accusations may be
made three responses.First, there seems little reason to grant freedom of testation
to one who has restricted the freedom of another by encouraging her to subjugate
her way of life to his. Secondly, it is not the Act which threatens the institution of
marriage but the testator's conduct in engaging in a mistress relationship during
his lifetime. Thirdly, although induced dependency may be viewed as harmful to
women, that harm will not be removed by imposing a different form of harm -
homelessness and penury - which would result from the denial of a remedy to an
already dependent mistress. If the mistress relationship is deplored by society any
sanction which purports to eradicate the relationship must operate equally against
both participants in the relationship and not merely against the female. Any repeal
of section l(l)(e) of the Inheritance Act which would prevent applications by
mistresses for maintenance would be to indulge in an exercise in sexism. That
cannot be the object of good law.
Whether Parliament should now turn its attention to the predicament of a
mistress whose relationship ends not by the death of her lover but by
abandonment remains a contentious issue.21 If a dependent mistress is to be
permitted to apply for maintenance where the relationship is ended by the death of
her lover there seems to be every reason to enact legislation which would equally
permit her to make a claim on the breakdown of her relationship with her lover.
Justice which takes effect only on death is most unsatisfactory. If domestic
violence is to be regarded as a problem for those who cohabit, albeit temporarily, in
adefacto matrimonial relationship, there is no reason to disregard the plight of the
mistress who faces domestic violence. Any proposed statute relating to support
could use the Inheritance Act as its prototype. Dependency of the mistress during
the relationship could be the key factor for the purposes of determining financial
provision.22 The existing Domestic Violence legislation requires very little
amendment to grant protection from molestation for a man and woman who have
19. See, e.g., Green, (1985) 51 M.L.R. 187.
20. Ibid., at p.207.
21. See, e.g., Freeman and Lyon, Cohabitation Without Marn'age (1983), at p.183 et seq.
22. See Blake, (1982) 12 Fam. Law 95; Eekelaar, (1975) 38M.L.R. 241; Harpum, [1982J Oxf.Jo.L.S.
277.
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engaged in a relationship of some permanence with each other. Unless such
protective legislation is enacted a mistress must continue to hope that, if her
relationship with her lover comes to an end, he should die rather than abandon her.
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